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Abstract
In Formations of European Modernity, Gerard Delanty, one of the 
foremost social theoreticians of Europe, offers a historical-sociological 
assessment of the idea of Europe as the development of modernity from a 
cosmopolitan perspective. With this book, based upon a broad and impres-
sive discussion of sociological and historical literature, Delanty some-
what comes back from his earlier constructivist approach in favour of a 
theory that emphasizes the originality of Europe and assesses European 
history as the development of modernity, interpreted in a classical neo-
Weberian sense. This approach sits uneasily with his ambition to present 
a cosmopolitan view on Europe, which emphasizes the interactions of 
Europe with the rest of the world, all the more so as he largely ignores 
the postcolonial critiques of Eurocentric narratives as well as moderniza-
tion theories. While Delanty is still quite successful in his assessment of 
historical diversities in Europe, Formations of European Modernity nev-
ertheless disappoints. While the focus on global interactions is highly 
commendable, the lack of critical assessment and contextualization leads 
to a neglect of the fact that Europe often despised the (contribution of 
the) other. Hence his presentation of cosmopolitan Europe is flawed, and 
remains if not Eurocentric at least overly Europhile.
Keywords: modernity, globalization, cosmopolitanism, European 
history, European identity
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Instead, the only lesson seemingly to be learnt by Europeans from their experience of what 
Habermas and Derrida call the ‘bloom’ of imperialism is the ability to ‘assume a  reflexive 
distance from themselves’, a distance which does not seem to provide reflections upon 
themselves.
 Gurminder K. Bhambra1
Revisiting ‘Inventing Europe’
Gerard Delanty, professor of sociology at the University of Sussex, 
is one of the foremost social theoreticians of Europe today. His book 
Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (1995) is one of the rare soci-
ological studies that has had a wide reading among historians because 
of the constructivist discussion of European identity. His approach 
seems to correspond to historical discussions of questions of collec-
tive identity inspired by cultural theory – social science and cultural 
theory become very close in this particularly inspiring book.2 More 
recently Delanty has become one of the leading theoreticians of cos-
mopolitanism, in which he not only rethinks the place of nations and 
Europe in a world of increasing connectivities, transnational organi-
zations and global forces, but emphasizes ‘the capacity of self-prob-
lematization and new ways of seeing the world’, in particular ‘the 
critical and reflexive consciousness of heterogeneity as opposed to the 
quintessential modernist spirit of an homogenous vision of sovereign 
statehood’.3 If Delanty publishes a new book, especially with the most 
promising title Formations of European Modernity: A Historical and 
Political Sociology of Europe, it really is something to look forward to: 
he seems to be one of those rare sociologists who is able to bridge the 
gap between sociology and history. The book is also presented as an 
interdisciplinary endeavour.
Formations of European Modernity started as a new edition of his 
earlier classic Inventing Europe but resulted in a totally new and par-
ticularly ambitious book in which the author aims at discussing Europe 
in its global and historical context, moving away from the emphasis 
on the question of the waning of the nation-state and the parallel emer-
gence of new transnational associations and a European ‘super-state’, 
towards a ‘cosmopolitan’ focus on global justice, governance and the 
social transformations resulting from more complex globalization pro-
cesses. Surprisingly however, Delanty confesses to going back on his 
FORMATIONS OF EUROPEAN MODERNITY
HCM 2015, VOL. 3, NO. 1 75
constructivist approach which, in his own words, was ‘useful for the 
critical purpose of unmasking the “Grand Narratives” of history’ but 
risks leading to ‘fairly simplistic arguments and polemical positions’ 
(x). It is rare to see a scholar so explicitly renounce some of his or her 
earlier work – especially as there was nothing simplistic in the way 
he made his case before – and it reveals a most commendable cour-
age. But the move raises questions nevertheless – what does he actually 
mean by these ‘simplistic arguments and polemical positions’? Here, as 
elsewhere in the book where one finds similarly strong statements con-
demning work done by others, the author remains remarkably uncom-
municative, leaving the reader the task of finding examples.
The question returns when Delanty refers to Dipesh Chakrabarty’s 
famous call to ‘provincialize’ Europe, which he interprets as not view-
ing Europe ‘as a normative or evaluative reference point for all parts 
of the world; in other words it should be discovered as it is’. One may 
wonder what the latter might mean, as it conspicuously recalls Ranke’s 
‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’ [what actually happened] – and if there 
is one thing that can be concluded from Delanty’s assessment, it is 
that his history is all but ‘Rankean’. The following sentence increases 
the feeling of uneasiness that begins to creep into the reading of the 
book: ‘“Provincializing Europe” is a demonstration of the limits of 
the global relevance of Europe without denying the validity of many 
of its achievements or the possibility of internal logics of develop-
ment’ (7, emphasis added). While Chakrabarty explicitly opposes the 
cultural relativism that the title of his own book seems to suggest, 
‘without denying the validity of many of its achievements’ does not 
constitute the core of Chakrabarty’s argument either. It slowly dawns 
on the reader that Delanty’s aim is somehow to ‘redress the balance’ 
of the postcolonial and historical critique of Eurocentric narratives – 
reminiscent of how some in the US oppose historical ‘revisionism’ 
that ‘emphasizes negative aspects of our nation’s history while omit-
ting or minimizing positive aspects’.4 Delanty, too, explicitly opposes 
a narrative that in his eyes overly stresses the ‘dark side’ of European 
history.5 Although he corroborates the ambition to ‘counter-act the 
rosy picture of the rise of Europe and the uncritical celebrations of its 
achievements’, he states that such histories will not help explaining 
‘the specificity of Europe’ (5). Why the specificity of Europe should 
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reside only in positive features remains a mystery – and a most ques-
tionable argument.
European Modernity
Delanty uses modernity as the central framework in understanding 
the historical development of Europe both in its unity and its diver-
sity. However, as readers of this journal will certainly be familiar with, 
the concept has been hotly debated, particularly since the 1990s (once 
again, one should say, as debates on the concept of modernity tend to 
return with the regularity of spring blossoms and autumn colours). 
Scholars in the wake of Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno actu-
ally argue that in whatever way modernity is defined – as an intellec-
tual story of progress, rationalization and enlightenment or in terms of 
social processes of urbanization, functional differentiations and the like 
– European or western history cannot be regarded as a simple road, let 
alone a smooth one, towards progress.6 Postcolonial scholars moreo-
ver observed that traditional narratives of modernity ignore the colo-
nial context in at least two ways. Firstly, they discount the European 
or ‘western’ politics of power and submission that were implemented 
alongside the many ways of appropriation and transformation that 
altered the meaning of the concept as a result of the imperial encounter. 
Secondly, they also destroyed the popular image of colonialism as a 
civilizing mission or benevolent activity of modernization and develop-
ment, and highlighted the violence and hypocrisy of the colonial pro-
ject. The latter even came to be viewed as a prelude to the Holocaust, 
which became the pinnacle of Europe’s twentieth century and of ‘the 
modern project’ itself; it has even become a constituent element of the 
way the EU imagines European identity today.7 Emphasizing the ‘Dark 
Side’ of modernity has become a popular trope indeed.
The concept of ‘multiple modernities’ emerged in the 1990s as one 
sociological and philosophical answer to the problem of the multi-
ple ways in which societies over the world gave shape to it (Shmuel 
Eisenstadt; Charles Taylor).8 However, as Arif Dirlik and Volker H. 
Schmidt observed,9 the concept in fact only confirms the western ori-
gins of modernity, while other scholars deny these exclusively western 
roots, referring even to ‘lost modernities’ originating in non-western 
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societies, rejecting the chronological straitjacket associated with 
European modernity.10 The result of this questioning may lead to the 
impression of a Babylonian confusion, and give way to the conclusion 
that the concept has become virtually meaningless; many if not most 
historians effectively abandoned the concept altogether or follow the 
approach advocated by Frederick Cooper to focus on the use of the 
term in different contexts (‘[Scholars] should ask how [modernity] is 
being used and why’).11 Certainly though this solution also has obvious 
disadvantages – what to do with movements that reject modernity or at 
least some political interpretations of the term, such as fascism or ultra-
montane Catholicism? They have been reinterpreted as modern phe-
nomena, aiming at a radical transformation of the world, albeit in their 
own terms. In this respect a new generation of historians in the wake of 
Cooper has developed their own ‘cosmopolitan’ history (without refer-
ring to that term though) by focusing on how European concepts have 
interacted and diffused globally, an approach which situates Europe in 
a network of permanent influences and interactions in which the ques-
tion of origin evaporates as largely irrelevant.12 What does appear from 
all these observations in the first place, however, is that the concept is 
all but neutral and always imbedded in a context of power, appropria-
tion and interpretation, and hence should be properly historicized and 
contextualized, including our own use of it.
In his definition of modernity Gerard Delanty focuses particularly 
on human agency, the ability ‘to transform the world in the image of 
a possible future’, encompassing politics, economics, as well as cul-
ture. This easily leads to a Whiggish representation of history as one 
of progress, all the more so as history is considered, as is the case 
here, as a ‘learning process’ (referring to Jürgen Habermas) even if it 
allows for ‘regressions’ (18) – indeed hardly compatible with a his-
tory that focuses on the ‘dark sides’ of modernity. Nevertheless, fol-
lowing Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Peter Wagner’s emphasis 
on reflexivity, Delanty ascribes to modernity a fundamental duality, of 
always oscillating ‘between communicative rationality and instrumen-
tal rationality, between democracy and capitalism, between autonomy 
and power’ (19). Illustrative is the (not very surprising) observation 
that Eurocentrism and the criticism aimed at Eurocentrism became both 
associated with modern European culture (e.g. 182; 152–153). From 
this perspective Delanty understands modernity as a cultural model that 
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derives from different ideas and social sectors, expressing themselves 
in different ways. Liberal democracy, communism and fascism hence 
all offered rivalling projects of modernity in the twentieth century (19; 
23; 215–242).
This approach may dissociate modernity from Europe. Though 
Delanty indeed affirms this conclusion (20), it rather conflicts with his 
argument that forms of modernity are not entirely open, as the ‘vari-
ous forms modernity have taken are determined by the relationship 
between capitalism, the state and civil society’ (19–20), which rather 
locates the origin of modernity in a specific time and a specific place. 
Moreover, a feature of modernity being that it understands itself to be 
modern, the encroachment within a particular intellectual tradition and 
its associated language is further emphasized. Hence modernity, or 
at least European modernity, is the product of a particular European 
conjuncture clearly establishing itself since the sixteenth century in 
Europe, which then spread over the world. Consequently, Delanty fol-
lows Peter Wagner (and others, such as Arif Dirlik and Volker Schmidt) 
in speaking of ‘varieties of modernity’ rather than of ‘multiple moderni-
ties’ (20). Modernity then becomes ‘a singular condition while taking 
multiple forms’ (24).
More interesting from my perspective is that Delanty also forcefully 
pleads for the consideration of the global context as an essential part of 
any social analysis. The concept of critical cosmopolitanism as defined 
in the introductory chapter, focusing on openness to the world and the 
willingness to change in the interaction with others, recognizing other-
ness in oneself, looks more than promising in this respect (27). More 
than his ambiguous definition of modernity, critical cosmopolitanism 
appears indeed open-ended, culture-free and ‘reflexive’ and, hence, 
very suitable for historical analysis.
A Cosmopolitan History?
Delanty develops his argument through a largely chronological or 
epochal structure based upon a vast and erudite assessment of histori-
cal and social science literature. His main point is to clarify the devel-
opment of a specific societal model ‘the chief characteristic of which 
was that neither the state nor capitalism entirely dominated society’ 
FORMATIONS OF EUROPEAN MODERNITY
HCM 2015, VOL. 3, NO. 1 79
(21), creating the conditions in which a critical modernity could arise. 
Although he explicitly recognizes the discontinuities and breaks, this 
structure almost inevitably produces a narrative of progress and devel-
opment, which in practice largely mirrors the most traditional histories 
of the emergence of a European idea: he traces the origins of European 
modernity in Greco-Roman and Judaic legacies and Christianity, fur-
ther emphasizing the importance of the Renaissance, humanism and the 
Enlightenment, and the rise of the nation-state. Howerver, Delanty adds 
an important dimension to these stories of origin by including trans-civ-
ilizational influences and interactions with other, mainly neighbouring 
cultures. This cosmopolitan orientation entices him to include a discus-
sion on the ‘Byzantine legacy’ and the significance of the Islamic world 
in the foundation of Europe’s modernity – certainly a welcoming and 
refreshing perspective. Rather puzzling though is that Germanic and 
Celtic people apparently did not contribute significantly to the forma-
tion of modern Europe, although they did develop very relevant ideas 
about the organization of society that left their mark on the medieval 
world and indirectly on later developments. Perhaps in his eyes they did 
not constitute a ‘civilization’, as Delanty explicitly frames his history of 
Europe as a history of European civilization, reviving a concept that is 
rather contested by most world historians today. It also reminds one of 
another contested concept, that of ‘peoples without history’. Apparently 
non-literary peoples counted among these as well. Incidentally it seems 
that contemporary Judaism is also excluded from the main European 
narrative, as the Judaic legacy is, as usual, relegated to the world of the 
Old Testament, though Delanty occasionally mentions Jews as media-
tors between antique and modern systems of knowledge – for exam-
ple referring to Jews who kept ancient Greek texts and translated them 
from Arabic.
In this context, Delanty refers to the work of the French philosopher 
Rémi Brague (48) who considers the eclectic nature of European soci-
ety to be one of its features. That certainly is the case. However, at the 
same time the reference to Brague is also rather odd as the latter empha-
sizes the fundamental break between the medieval and the old Roman 
world: for Brague the core of Europe’s history is not a continuation of 
an ancient past of Greek and Roman greatness, but in contrast a radical 
departure from it. Central in Brague’s assessment is the longing for the 
power and greatness of Antiquity: its shadow is not so much a legacy 
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as a rivalry, leading to forms of appropriation of what is fundamentally 
alien. Brague thus rejects the linear connection between Roman and 
Greek Antiquity and (medieval) European culture. For the French phi-
losopher incidentally this constitutes the fundamental difference with 
the Byzantine and even the Islamic worlds, which in his eyes constitute 
a continuation of Antiquity and thus do not share this alterity.13
This brings me to the core of my critique of Delanty. Although he 
acknowledges that cosmopolitanism is not a European singularity and 
that other civilizations could be even more cosmopolitan, he argu-
ably overstates his case with regard to Europe. As I explain at length 
elsewhere, Europe has a long history that hardly qualifies as one of 
openness and inclusion.14 In contrast, most of its history is particularly 
exclusive, a ‘persecuting society’ (R.I. Moore) in the Middle Ages as 
well as much later, in which non-Christians were hardly tolerated, as 
especially Jews experienced so many times throughout European his-
tory. Certainly, as traditional (Eurocentric) histories of science argue 
(followed by Delanty), medieval monks and scholars studied ancient 
texts and developed a sense of critique and curiosity that grew into the 
foundation of modern science. However they ignore that non-western 
and non-Christian scholars were not welcome at its centres of learn-
ing, unlike most societies of South and East Asia: learned Indians or 
Chinese, if they had ventured so far into the barbaric northwest, would 
have had no chance of being promoted to the highest ranks of scholar-
ship or councillorship such as a Marco Polo or the famous Jesuits at 
Chinese imperial courts: they would most likely have ended up hanged. 
Even Arab merchants did not continue their business travels into the 
European interior. Certainly, Europeans did learn a lot from other civ-
ilizations, but it was not because they were so welcoming and open 
towards the other. When Europeans dominated the world from around 
1800 onwards, as Chakrabarty has reminded us, they actually ousted 
non-western forms of knowledge.15 That traditional European histori-
ography on the ‘rise of the West’ has largely ignored the significance 
of non-European science and technology – what Jack Goody called 
The Theft of History – is actually an expression of this exclusionary 
practice.16 This does not mean that some Europeans were not driven by 
genuine curiosity and cultural forms and knowledge could not find their 
way into Europe, only that society was organized in a way that did not 
allow ‘others’ to be part of it and contribute as such to its development: 
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its borders remained guarded and controlled. And scientific curiosity by 
all means is not a privilege of Europeans.
The chapter on the relationship between Europe and Islam illustrates 
the strength as well as the fundamental weakness of Delanty’s approach. 
It is quite accurate in demonstrating the interaction that existed between 
the Islamic and the European Christian worlds, showing that the impact 
of Islamic culture on Europe was far greater and important than has 
often been assumed, that the relationship itself was far more complex 
than one of simple opposition and that this also changed over time. 
Delanty in this sense admirably assesses the different ways of imagin-
ing the ‘other’ in terms of attraction and repulsion. However, in his 
eagerness to state his case for a cosmopolitan Europe, Delanty pushes 
his argument too far, ignoring the politics of exclusion, isolation and 
superiority that equally, if not more, characterized Europe for most 
of its existence, not only during the heyday of colonialism – which is 
hardly touched upon.
Focusing on the ‘positive’ dimensions of European history leads to 
rather distorted historical representations also in other parts of the book. 
So Delanty discusses the formation of world fairs and exhibitions in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century as places for nation-building that 
nevertheless facilitated cosmopolitan interactions. This they certainly 
were, but they also particularly emphasized European superiority and 
displayed a racist division of the world. Though they cannot be reduced 
to this – in that sense I agree with Delanty –, the interactions that they 
generated cannot be simplified as signs of Europe’s openness to the 
world either. Likewise, while arguing that the Enlightenment thinkers 
did not just create an Orientalist opposition to the East, Delanty under-
estimates the enlightened and modern drive to classification and order-
ing that, even if inspired by genuine interest, did constrain the other.
Chapter nine of the book, focusing on the interplay between nation-
states and empires, nevertheless includes some penetrating insights 
about the importance of imperialism, colonialism and racism that per-
vaded European societies. Delanty actually demonstrates a deep under-
standing of the complex relationships between colonies and metropoles, 
even recognizing the possible contribution of others to European mod-
ernization and democratization – he explicitly refers to the American 
Revolution and the Haitian slave revolt. But in the end the significance 
of European imperialism is the diffusion of European ideas about 
PASTURE
82 HCM 2015, VOL. 3, NO. 1
human rights and democracy. If ‘Europe was shaped by its colonies in 
both positive and negative ways’ (194) the balance for Delanty clearly 
tips to the positive side – all the more so as this paragraph remains quite 
short in the whole book.
For a book that aims at offering a cosmopolitan alternative to 
Eurocentric assessments of European history, Formations of European 
Modernity pays little attention to the perspective of the ‘other’: inter-
actions are viewed from a European perspective. In particular non-
European representations of Europe do not figure as part of the interac-
tion. How Muslims perceived Europe for example remains unexplored, 
though one can wonder if an identity is not also made by the perspective 
of others. The lack of outside perspectives returns in the failure to intro-
duce a relevant comparative assessment. This for example comes to the 
fore in his discussions on European diversity. As many others, Delanty 
emphasizes European diversity as one of its main features, rejecting 
a popular but overly simplistic view of an age-old Europeanization. 
Actually Delanty is particularly effective in discussing Europe’s diver-
sities, especially regional ones. He recognizes that they are based on dis-
continuities and that there was no continuous common alterity against 
which Europe set itself off. Importantly, not even Islam functioned as 
an inimical other: the relationship was far more complex and variable. 
Nevertheless this emphasis on European diversity, popular as it is, is 
puzzling from a global comparative perspective. Is Europe really more 
diverse than other parts of the world? More than India, with its thou-
sands of tongues, where diversity perhaps constitutes the sole common 
experience of the region before the coming of the British?17 Or more 
than Southeast Asia, sometimes referred to as a ‘noodle box’ because 
of its intermingling of ethnicities, languages and religions? I don’t 
think so: pushing an argument formulated by the late Tony Judt beyond 
its initial intention, I would contend that Europe, especially Western 
Europe, should be considered uniquely obsessed with diversity while 
being remarkably homogenous in terms of language, ethnicity and reli-
gion.18 Nevertheless, Delanty does recognize homogenizing forces in 
Europe’s early modern history as well (e.g. 137–142), and actually his 
discussion of the tension between homogenization and pluralization is 
particularly nuanced and insightful.
A lack of comparative perspective makes some arguments appear 
rather gratuitous. Claiming that Europe was unique because it ‘was 
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never fully integrated from “above” by the state or by an ecclesiasti-
cal authority’ (145) for example leaves the reader wondering on what 
grounds statements like this one are based. Is there some comparison 
involved with China, which is indeed the result of centuries of Han 
Chinese political and cultural imperialism? With India, which was 
 unified by the British; or with South-East Asia that has never been 
 unified in any way? With Latin America perhaps, divided notwith-
standing Spanish-Portuguese colonialism? As regards the statement 
that Europe was unique because it ‘was never fully integrated from 
above’ one could easily make a case for the opposite. Europe indeed 
was considered a unity at least by some elites already since the elev-
enth, twelfth century if not earlier: Europe shares a common heritage of 
Christendom, with its innate Church-State conflict, which gave way to 
the idea of Europe as an escape from this division, a longing for a lost 
unity that never existed.19 Ideas about European unity emerged from 
various circles, but if the latter have one thing in common it is that they 
were driven by political and cultural elites, rather closely connected 
to the centres of power. In contrast of what perhaps may be a popular 
myth, they certainly did not emerge from a popular base. This suggests 
a rather important degree of ‘integration’ from above.
Likewise one wonders on what basis other statements about the 
specificity of Europe are made, as the one with regard to the core of the 
European social mode: ‘The specificity of Europe as a world historical 
region does not consist in democracy, human rights, republican govern-
ment liberty, freedom – all of which have been regarded as the core of 
European values – but in the ways in which these ideas have been taken 
up in social struggles as well as in the institutional forms that followed 
from such struggles’ (274). I am sure there is much truth in this conclu-
sion, if only because ‘democracy, human rights, republican government 
liberty, freedom’ have been pursued, albeit in different forms, in other 
civilizations as well, and Europe has created a (or several types of) wel-
fare state(s). However, I would hesitate to affirm with any confidence 
that the longing for social justice was so exclusively European (at least 
if one adopts a rather open definition of social justice). Moreover, while 
the concept has been interpreted in quite divergent ways within Europe 
also, not all movements in European history placed social justice on 
top of their agenda. But again the cosmopolitan dimension apparently 
does not imply a global comparative discussion. I cannot help that I 
PASTURE
84 HCM 2015, VOL. 3, NO. 1
automatically recalled Chakrabarty’s comment on yet one more of these 
theories to ‘embrace the entirety of humanity … in relative, and some-
times absolute ignorance of the majority of mankind’.20 Modernization 
theories invariably qualify for this qualification – the experiences and 
perspectives of others finally do not matter.
The Uses of History
The last chapter, published earlier as a LSE working paper, assesses 
European history in terms of conflicting narratives of heritage. The first 
and most common one advanced is that of a shared political legacy, 
with deep roots in history, though Delanty emphasizes that the content 
of this shared heritage is in itself disputed. In a powerful paragraph he 
again refers to the tension between unity and diversity, warning against 
narratives that overly emphasize unity without taking into account the 
historical diversities. While admitting the inclusion of contesting mem-
ories may be ‘a necessary step’, he strongly opposes a narrative that 
focuses on the memories of victims and the persecuted, prohibiting a 
common European memory, as ‘it cannot be the basis for the future 
which requires positive models of identification’ (298). For Delanty the 
cosmopolitan heritage of interaction and dialogue in contrast may con-
stitute such a positive source of identification and may help Europe ‘to 
come to terms with its own cultural and political diversity’, concluding 
though that it may be time for Europe ‘to move beyond its past’ (299). 
One may wonder if Delanty’s overly positive representation of Europe’s 
cosmopolitan history, of ‘model Europe’, really is what the continent 
needs. Especially in Asia the EU’s complacent attitude with regard to 
human rights, its self-proclaimed moral superiority, constitutes a source 
of permanent irritation, even if this sometimes may be an easy way of 
condoning human rights abuses as well. Moreover, one could make a 
case that Europe should rather face its past ‘as it really was’ in order to 
reconnect and reconcile with others who were often victims of its impe-
rial ambitions as well as with itself – God knows how many scars still 
linger because of an unresolved past.
As regards Europe itself, the interpretation of the current malaise 
with dealing with diversity, expressed in xenophobia and racism, as 
resulting from insecurity and uncertainty, but also as ‘symptomatic of a 
FORMATIONS OF EUROPEAN MODERNITY
HCM 2015, VOL. 3, NO. 1 85
wider cultural crisis in the values on which Europe is based’ (304–305) 
could be challenged. Indeed, a whole different picture emerges when 
one understands Europe’s problems with racism and xenophobia in its 
deep-rooted longing for similarity and homogeneity (what the German 
historian Thomas Mergel calls Europe’s Sehnsucht nach Ähnlichkeit), 
which had its parallel in its exclusive attitude cherishing feelings of 
superiority and difference towards other civilizations.21 Paradoxically 
such an alternative assessment may lead to a more optimistic prospect, 
as it may suggest that Europe finally is starting to move away from its 
troubled past and towards a more inclusive society: the current crisis 
may then rather be interpreted as a rear-guard fight. I do not know: 
historians make such bad prophets, though not necessarily worse than 
more confident colleagues from other disciplines.
This brings me to some comments on the use of history. Gerard 
Delanty considers the work of historians as poor value for a contempo-
rary European self-understanding, either because they overemphasize 
the ‘dark side’ of European history or, mostly, because they shy away 
from theory and ‘grand narratives’ – as in Norman Davies’ Europe, a 
History (1996). Even worse, some even deny the existence of a com-
mon European history claiming ‘that there are only different construc-
tions of Europe which means many different things to many different 
people’ (292, referring to the work of John G.A. Pocock).22 Although a 
fervent proponent of interdisciplinarity myself, I admit that I was never 
as acutely aware of the different conceptual expectations between soci-
ologists and historians than after reading this ‘historical and political 
sociology of Europe’. Historians indeed do not study history with an 
eye to the present, not even with the intention of explaining it – the 
idea of history as magistra vitae has already been abandoned since the 
1960s. Historians are well aware though that they inevitably write from 
and are embedded in the present. It is in that sense that their work, even 
if related to an ancient past, may be relevant to the present after all, by 
demonstrating the differences as well as the similarities. The latter is 
not necessarily the same as continuity: understanding discontinuities is 
as least as important in understanding the present as continuities.23 But 
perhaps the difference is not so much between historians and sociolo-
gists as between two modes of thinking: between those who emphasize 
Verstehen (understanding), as Hannah Arendt understands it, and those 
PASTURE
86 HCM 2015, VOL. 3, NO. 1
who have a case to defend. Delanty clearly belongs to the latter. But 
who can maintain that Verstehen has no relevance to the present?
Conclusion
Certainly Formations of European Modernity is in many ways an 
impressive achievement, also from a historical perspective. It is based 
upon a huge body of literature from a wide variety of angles. Some 
assessments are particularly nuanced and insightful. Though I paid only 
scant attention to it, Delanty’s assessment of European spatialities – 
the regional diversities and the importance of transnational connections 
transcending the nation-state in modern times – offers a different and 
exciting way of imagining Europe. Also his emphasis on interactions 
is actually what a critical history of Europe requires. Hence the book’s 
cosmopolitan ambition may still figure as a challenging eye opener to 
many, especially those readers who are not familiar with postcolonial 
studies. Nevertheless, the book falls short of expectations. It overem-
phasizes the European ‘openness’ for change and global interaction in 
history, it hardly includes the experience of the ‘other’, and contains a 
complacent narrative that glorifies Europe’s role in the world. Delanty 
does recognize Europe’s imperial and colonial past and its racism, but 
to a large extent downplays its importance and turns it into a factor 
that stimulated its modernization. Referring to Gurminder Bhambra’s 
strident critique of the reflexive modernity of Habermas and Derrida 
quoted in the epigraph, one could observe furthermore that it does not 
appear in this book as an episode which figures centrally in the learning 
process that is supposed to animate the history of European moder-
nity either. Racism and colonialism themselves of course were also the 
results of ‘lessons’ that were drawn from history. What happened is that 
Delanty’s presentation of Europe’s cosmopolitan history has become 
too much of a reflection of the present: finally it almost says more about 
the contemporary sociological preoccupation with globalization and 
cosmopolitanism than about the past. Paradoxically this means that it is 
less illuminating of the present as well, as how can one properly under-
stand the present if one misinterprets its past?
This observation may sound particularly awkward for a book 
that places reflexivity and critical cosmopolitanism at the core of the 
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modern project. Dipesh Chakrabarty once famously called for ‘provin-
cializing Europe’ – meaning ‘to write into the history of modernity the 
ambivalences, contradictions, the use of force, and the tragedies and 
ironies that attend it’ (43). Although Delanty to some extent includes 
them into his narrative of European history, in the end it remains mar-
ginal to his overall argument. Hence the impression of deep disappoint-
ment prevails after reading this book – this ‘cosmopolitanism’ turns out 
to be quite Eurocentric. The new global history as practiced by histo-
rians such as Christopher Baily, Sebastian Conrad, Frederik Cooper, 
Matthias Middell, Jürgen Osterhammel and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 
among others, in my view offers better venues to arrive at a cosmopoli-
tan, non-Eurocentric history of Europe, avoiding the complacent over-
emphasizing of Europe’s highly questionable ‘openness’ and reflexiv-
ity. However, in contrast to Delanty’s definition of modernity which 
starts as an open-ended one but gradually solidifies into the traditional 
European singularity, in their work European modernity seems melting 
into air as does the question of its origins. But as Chakrabarty and even 
Cooper concede, I am not sure it is possible to dispose of a concept 
that has put such a deep mark on our history and imagination. A criti-
cal cosmopolitan approach as Delanty advocates may in the end offer 
a promising way to study European history, on condition of adopting a 
more critical global perspective and a more open attitude towards the 
complexities and paradoxes of the European experience in its totality.
Notes
 Writing a review of Gerard Delanty’s book Formations of European 
Modernity. A Historical and Political Sociology of Europe (Basingstoke, 
2013) and discussing his ideas in class was an assignment in the Master 
of European Studies: Transnational and Global Perspectives at the KU 
Leuven. The book led to some passionate debates. Some students made 
particularly insightful reviews, some left a trace in this essay. I would 
particularly like to thank Gloria Ghéquière, Melissa Grünewig, Elisa 
Masschelein, as well as the anonymous reviewers of this essay. They do 
not necessarily share my ideas though.
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